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04453nam a2200253 a 4500 |
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1794458 |
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20171111234541.0 |
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121116s2012 caua ob 000 0 eng|d |
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|a 9780833076793(ebook)
|z 9780833076786 (pbk. : alk. paper)
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| 040 |
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|a CaPaEBR
|b eng
|e rda
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| 050 |
1 |
4 |
|a U163
|b .L518 2012eb
|e pn
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Libicki, Martin C.
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| 245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Crisis and escalation in cyberspace /
|c Martin C. Libicki.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (199 pages) :
|b illustrations (some color)
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| 500 |
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|a "Prepared for the United States Air Force."
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|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 163-172).
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| 505 |
0 |
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|a Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Information warfare
|z United States.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Escalation (Military science)
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Cyberspace
|x Security measures.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Crisis management
|x Government policy
|z United States.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Cyberterrorism
|x Prevention.
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|a Conflict management.
|u http://site.ebrary.com/lib/ucy/Doc?id=10818055
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| 952 |
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|a CY-NiOUC
|b 5a0458a66c5ad14ac1ed1b0a
|c 998a
|d 945l
|e -
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|x m
|z Books
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